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AS THE WORLD TURNS: REVISITING
RUDOLF SCHLESINGER'S STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE "IN THE
LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE LAW"
Peter Winship*
Problems of commercial law are apt to be similar or at least
comparable in all commercial countries, so that in this field,
perhaps more than in any other, foreign experience is likely
to be instructive. As was said by a leading English scholar,
"The value of comparative investigation of commercial law is
so obvious as to make it unnecessary to labour the point."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Rudolf Schlesinger's study of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) "in the light of comparative law" is an all-but-forgotten
minor legal classic. Written as part of a report for the New York Law
Revision Commission,2 the study was printed as part of the 1955
Commission reports on the UCC3 and subsequently published in the
inaugural issue of the Inter-American Law Review.4 The study itself
does not examine each section of the proposed UCC: "[A]cting
merely as a reviewing critic and striving to complete its report within
* James Cleo Thompson Sr. Trustee Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University School of Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative
Law, 1 INTER-AM. L. REv. 11, 27 (1959) (citing H. C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law 34
(2d ed. 1949)). Because readers are more likely to have access to this publication, page
numbers cited in the text of this Essay are to it rather than to the official report cited infra
note 2.
2. Problems of Codification of Commercial Law, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65(A) (1955).
3. 1 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955:
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 87-123 (1955) [hereinafter NYLRC].
Professor Schlesinger contributed Part III, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light of
Comparative Law, and collaborated in the introduction and conclusions of the report. Id.
at 33. His co-consultant, Professor Edwin W. Patterson, wrote Part II, The Codification
of Commercial Law in the Light of Jurisprudence. Id.
4. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 17-56.
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a relatively short period," the Commission limited itself to examining
"only the method, overall coverage and organization of the Code."5
Consequently, Professor Schlesinger examines the arguments for and
against codification, as well as the problem of separate codification of
commercial law. His analysis demonstrates, in a very practical way,
how a comparative perspective might be useful in the reform of
domestic law. As such, the study is typical of the work of Professor
Schlesinger, who was-and is-the dean of comparativists in the
United States.
6
Few comparative studies of the UCC have been published in the
United States since the Schlesinger report.7 Foreign scholars-and
German graduate students-rather than U.S. academics have been far
more interested in making comparisons. In the heady days of the
1960s, after all U.S. jurisdictions except Louisiana had enacted the
UCC, there was some talk of exporting all or part of the UCC. A
1968 Canadian conference asked, for example, whether Articles 2 and
9 were exportable.8 One of the participants at the conference noted:
Because General Schnader in his lifetime was not at all
cordial to dismemberment for partial enactment, there was
some initial reticence by the Americans in respect to the
Ontario project [to draft a secured transactions law inspired
5. Id. at 17.
6. A recent issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law, in honor of Professor
Schlesinger, attests to his standing among comparativists. Rudolf B. Schlesinger-A
Tribute, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 317-486 (1995). The issue includes a list of his publications.
Id. at 483-86.
7. For a somewhat dated review of the literature, see Peter Winship, Contemporary
Commercial Law Literature in the United States, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 643, 669 n.155 (1982):
There have been very few comparative commercial law studies published in the
United States since 1970 .... There also have been several foreign law studies
which make little or no attempt to compare the foreign system with the Uniform
Commercial Code .... Important developments abroad have gone virtually
unnoticed in American law journals. Even within English-speaking countries
there have been remarkable developments, many of which show the influence
of the Uniform Commercial Code... . There have, however, been some
references to Canadian developments.
8. ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW: SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT, AND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 18-63, 291-395 (Jacob S. Ziegel & William F. Foster eds., 1969)
(containing papers presented at a conference held at McGill University on September 3-5,
1968). Among the attendees from the United States were E. Allan Farnsworth, Grant
Gilmore, John Honnold, Harry Sachse, and Byron Sher. Id. at vi-vii.
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by UCC article 9] but at later stages they gave full and
helpful assistance.9
By the 1970s, however, this enthusiasm had waned. When individual
Canadian provinces adapted and even improved Article 9, U.S.
practitioners and academics barely noticed."
Recently U.S. practitioners and academics have shown a growing
interest in foreign and international commercial law. The Permanent
Editorial Board (PEB) for the UCC has invited foreign scholars to
comment on the redrafting of Articles 2 and 9.1' Renewed efforts
are underway to "export" Article 9." U.S. academics are once again
attending Canadian conferences on whether Article 9 can, or should
be, exported." The American Law Institute has dipped its toe into
the study of foreign law by undertaking a study of insolvency laws in
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries. 4 U.S.
law reviews have published several studies of how the drafting
committees revising UCC articles might usefully adapt specific
9. Albert S. Abel, Is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Exportable? The
Ontario Experience, in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW: SALES,
CONSUMER CREDIT, AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 8, at 294.
10. For contemporary references to the Canadian developments in U.S. law reviews,
see Peter F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE LJ. 1012, 1052-
53, 1054 n.156 (1978); Ray David Henson, Book Review, 12 OTrAWA L. REV. 514, 514
(1980). The waning interest among uniform law commissioners is documented in Peter
Winship, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
International Unification of Private Law, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 227, 273-79 (1992).
11. Fred H. Miller, Et Sic Ulterius II (part 2), UCC BULL., Nov. 1994, at 3.
12. These efforts are directed at both international and national projects. A project
within the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) draws
on Article 9 concepts for the proposed creation of an international security interest in
mobile equipment. Thomas J. Whalen, The Proposed Convention Governing the
Recognition and Enforcement of Security Interests in Mobile Equipment, 1995 COM. L.
ANN. 539,539-40. Reform efforts at the national level are spurred on by the World Bank
and by agencies interested in developing the legal infrastructure in states with newly-
emerging economies. For a thoughtful study, see Alejandro M. Garro, Security Interests
in Personal Property in Latin America: A Comparison with Article 9 and a Model for
Reform, 9 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 157 (1987).
13. See the papers presented on "How Far Is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code Exportable?" at the Twenty-Fifth Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer
Law, October 20-21, 1995, in Toronto. Professor Charles W. Mooney, co-reporter on the
revision of Article 9, was a panel member. These papers will be published in the Canadian
Business Law Journal.
14. For a brief description of the project, see A.L.I., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW 1-7
(Council Draft No. 1, Nov. 13, 1995).
1146 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1143
international projects. 5 And, last but not least, the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review is publishing this valuable Symposium to provide
an "outside" perspective..
Given the renewed interest in a comparative perspective, it is
time, I think, to reread Professor Schlesinger's 1955 study. What
questions does he ask? Are his answers still persuasive? Are the
questions themselves still relevant? Does a comparative perspective
still offer useful insights for U.S. scholars and practitioners? This
Essay touches on these, and other questions, to illustrate the richness
and continued relevance of the Schlesinger report.
II. REVISITING SCHLESINGER TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS OF
CODIFICATION
A. Should US. Commercial Law Be Codified?
In 1955 this was a "fundamental" question before U.S. lawyers. 16
It is not an issue of interest to contemporary civilians: For civil law
systems the issue of whether or not to codify is a matter of historical
interest only.'7 The issue before civilians is how to revise and
reorganize existing codes.18
Today the very question of whether U.S. commercial law should
be codified has an anachronistic ring. Professor Schlesinger's question
appears to have been answered with a resounding "Yes." In the
decade following his 1955 report, virtually all U.S. jurisdictions
enacted the UCC. During the last decade the UCC's sponsors have
added Articles 2A and 4A to deal with personal property leases and
wholesale wire transfers of funds, 9 while a drafting committee is
presently at work on a text governing licenses of intellectual proper-
ty.' Debate about these new provisions has focused more on their
content than on whether they should be included in an existing code.
Proponents have found useful templates in the UCC, as is shown by
15. See, e.g., James E. Byrne, Fundamental Issues in the Unification and Harmonization
of Letter of Credit Law, 37 LOY. L. REV. 1 (1991); Peter Winship, Domesticating
International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C. Article 2 in Light of the United Nations
Sales Convention, 37 LOY. L. REV. 43 (1991).
16. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 49.
17. Id, at 48-49.
18. lId at 49.
19. See U.C.C. art. 2A (1990) (regulating personal property leases); U.C.C. art. 4A
(1990) (regulating wholesale wire transfers of funds).
20. U.C.C. art. 2B (discussion draft Dec. 1, 1995).
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the close resemblance between Article 2 on sales and Article 2A on
leases. Opponents have objected to specific provisions, but few have
questioned the desirability of clear, comprehensive, and systematic
legislation.
There are limits. For a year before the summer of 1995, the
drafting committee revising Article 2 contemplated a hub-and-spoke
organization that would distinguish between general provisions for
commercial contracts-the hub-and specific provisions for specific
commercial contracts, such as sales and leases of personal proper-
ty-the spokes.2  When this proposal was first presented at a
meeting of the UCC committee of the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Business Law Section, several comparativists at the meeting
remarked on the "code-like" reasoning behind the proposal. When
put to the Uniform Commissioners, however, the proposal apparently
pushed the aesthetic value of a "rational" structure too far. Practical
considerations, rather than issues of principle, underlay the objections.
Why delay reform of sales law to tinker with a familiar structure?
How do we explain the new complexity to our state legislators?
This recent debate raises the question of whether U.S. lawyers
think "codification" when they support enactment of the UCC or its
recent accretions. Is the UCC viewed as more than ten separate
uniform law texts stapled together with a motley set of general
principles and definitions in a rarely-consulted Article 1? In other
words, is the UCC a "code"?
From the beginning there have been skeptics. Writing in 1962,
Homer Kripke stated:
It is fair to say that the draftsmen of the Code had an
anticodification or antistatute predilection. They did not
want to codify the law, in the continental sense of codifica-
tion. They wanted to correct some false starts, to point the
law in the indicated directions, and to restore the law
merchant as an institution for growth only lightly kept in
bounds by statute .... [T]he express statutory injunctions to
give effect to all of the nonstatutory influences for growth
21. Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangible Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and
Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337, 1340 (1994); see also Raymond
T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification of Commercial Contract Law, 18 RuTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.. 465, 481-89 (1992) (applying the "hub and spokes" concept to computer
software law).
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are so strong that continental codification is a misleading
analogy."'
Recent loosely-coordinated revisions of individual UCC provisions
reinforce this skepticism.
Scholars have been more agnostic. A recent "taxonomy" of
codes reminds us that there are codes and codes-and that the UCC
does not pretend to be a traditional European civil code.' From the
text itself however, one may tease code-like features. In a stimulat-
ing recent study, Professor Richard Buxbaum-not surprisingly, a
student of Professor Schlesinger's-does just this and concludes that
the Sales and the Sales Financing articles ... determine the
UCC structure and thus its status as a code. It is the Swiss
analogy at one end-the open-ended nature of the UCC
towards general principles of contract law-and this recogni-
tion of sales finance as central to an American code at the
other that set that structure.24
The general principles set out in Article 1 also distinguish the
UCC from other legislation. These principles are said to underlie all
the commercial transactions covered by the UCC, but there are few
such principles and what few there are have more or less relevance in
the context of individual articles. Perhaps one test of whether the
UCC is truly a code is whether its sponsors will review Article 1
seriously after the present round of revisions of individual articles.
A search for coherence in common functional and analytic traits
is also going on today in at least some civilian jurisdictions. If the
question of whether to codify was not relevant to civilians in 1955, the
issue they did find relevant-how to revise and reorganize existing
codes-is now relevant for both civilians and the sponsors of the
UCC. Talk in France of "decodification" of commercial law should
22. Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 331.
23. Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-Recent American
Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent Develop-
ment, 1994 WIs. L. REv. 1119, 1127-36.
24. Richard M. Buxbaum, Is the Uniform Commercial Code a Code?, in
RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE GESELLSCHAFr UND HANDELSRECHT: KARL N.
LLEWELLYN UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE 197, 219 (Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred
Rehbinder eds., 1994); see also William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and
the Civil Codes, 56 LA. L. REV. 231, 232-47 (1995); William D. Hawkland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 293 (asserting that the UCC
satisfies the fundamental characteristics of a code).
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now resonate in the United States. 5 Perhaps an updated compara-
tive study is needed.
B. Is Codification "Undemocratic"?
Professor Schlesinger takes seriously this surprising echo from the
nineteenth century debate between James Coolidge Carter and David
Dudley Field.26 Responding to Field's proposal to codify the
common law, Carter argued that codes are the products of arbitrary
despots, while the common law represents the ever-changing customs
of the people as expounded and administered by lawyers and
judges.2 Professor Schlesinger rebuts the argument in a few swift
paragraphs. Carter's argument is not only historically inaccurate but
his basic premise is more than questionable. Judge-made law does
not always express the will of the people more aptly than codification.
Napoleon's codes were popular in part because they curbed judicial
discretion at a time when the memory of the abuses of eighteenth
century judges was fresh.' That democratic ideals can be invoked
both for and against codification demonstrates that references to
democracy are "more emotional than rational. 29 "[C]odification is
merely a method-a method which in itself is neither moral nor
immoral, neither democratic nor tyrannical."3
Professor Schlesinger is surely right on all counts. His rebuttal
carried the day and the "Carter" arguments have disappeared from
what is left of the debate about whether to codify U.S. commercial
law.3' Law students are no longer exposed to Carter's concerns:
The latest edition of a leading commercial law casebook that used to
include a short excerpt from Carter's 1884 book now omits the
25. Bruno Oppetit, L'expgriencefrangaise de codification en matiere commerciale, 1990
RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY, CHRONIQUE [D.S. CHRON.] 1 (Fr.).
26. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 17-22.
27. Id. at 17-18.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Fortunately the debate has not disappeared from scholarly research. See, e.g.,
Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the
Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 95 (1989) (discussing the effect of
the Carter and Field debate on codification in the United States).
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excerpt?2 Other course materials make no reference to the debate
over codification.
For classroom purposes this neglect is unfortunate. Law students
must struggle with what it means to codify law in order to recognize
that Carter's argument is "more emotional than rational., 33 The
debate also induces students to consider the appropriate roles of the
legislature and judiciary. With a little historical perspective, students
may consider the changing attitudes even within the United States.
One possible scenario is that, whereas the drafters of the 1952 official
text respected the judiciary and had a healthy skepticism about the
"plain meaning" of rules, the drafters of revised Articles 2 and 4 look
to detailed rules to "ensure" certainty and to limit the discretion of
judges. A comparative perspective also illustrates shifting attitudes
towards the judiciary. The common law does not enforce "penalty
clauses"; traditional French civil law enforced all liquidated damage
clauses without limit. Today, however, the committee revising UCC
Article 2 limits the power of judges to strike down liquidated damage
clauses in commercial contracts. 34 Distrust of the judiciary in an era
of unbridled laissez faire, in other words, draws the borderline
between legislative and judicial functions in the United States closer
to the borderline found in nineteenth-century France. In the
meantime, however, French attitudes have changed somewhat. In
1985 the French amended the Code civil to allow a judge to revise a
clause when the liquidated sum is "manifestly excessive or pitiful.
35
32. Compare RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
LAW 8 (3d ed. 1981) (discussing Carter's position) with RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL.,
COMMERCIAL LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS 4-8 (4th ed. 1987) (omitting the dicussion of
Carter's position).
33. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 22.
34. Compare U.C.C. § 2-718 (1990) ("[A] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is void as a penalty.") with U.C.C. § 2-710 n.1 (discussion draft Oct. 1, 1995) ("A
term fixing a reasonable liquidation at the time of contract is enforceable even though the
amount fixed is unreasonable in light of the actual loss."). Without explanation, the
January 4, 1996 draft restores the requirement that liquidated damages be reasonable in
light of the actual losses. U.C.C. § 2-710(a) (discussion draft Jan. 4, 1996).
35. CODE CIVIL [C. CIv.] art. 1152 (Fr.). For analysis and comparison, see G. H.
TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACr: A COMPARATIVE AccouNT 219-44
(1988).
REVISITING RUDOLF SCHLESINGER
C. Can the Sponsors of the UCC Learn Anything from Civilians
About How to Draft the UCC?
After reviewing the civilian experience, Professor Schlesinger
concludes:
Models, to some extent worthy of emulation or adaptation,
may well be found in the civil law orbit with respect to the
methods to be used (a) in the preparatory research (includ-
ing comparative research) preceding the drafting of a code,
(b) in the drafting itseWt and (c) in the organized process of
submitting successive tentative drafts to the public and to the
legal profession for criticism and suggestions.36
On each of these points, Professor Schlesinger criticizes the methods
used by the sponsors of the UCC.
Not surprisingly, Professor Schlesinger returns several times to
the value of comparative research as a means of identifying useful
innovations and potential pitfalls. He argues against "a method of
code-making which proceeds without any thought of international
uniformity or harmonization, even within the common law world, and
without the slightest attempt to inspire cooperation and parallel
efforts in any other country."37 "We can learn," he notes, "from the
accomplishments and the mistakes of another country even though we
realize that in some respects its legal system necessarily differs from
our own."38 Most civil law jurisdictions rely on the specialized staffs
within a Ministry of Justice to draft codes, while the United States
does not have a comparable institution. "The Uniform Commercial
Code, of course, was not drafted by officials of a Ministry of Justice;
but that is hardly a sufficient reason for losing the advantages of a
method which permits us to learn from the accomplishments ... of
others."39
Little has changed since Professor Schlesinger wrote. The UCC
sponsors have not commissioned preparatory comparative research
before beginning work on revision of specific articles. As noted
earlier, the sponsors have now formally invited foreign scholars to
comment on drafts, but these scholars are offered no compensa-
tion-a practice puzzling to scholars not familiar with the American
36. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 56.
37. Id at 26 (footnote omitted).
38. Id at 26 n.35.
39. Id at 27.
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tradition of "voluntary" participation in law reform. Moreover, the
drafts themselves present a moving target as draft after draft follow
each other in rapid succession with basic policies left open. Unfortu-
nately the UCC sponsors are unable to look to the independent
research of U.S. comparativists to fill the gap: Few comparativists
focus on commercial law subjects covered by the UCC.
If little has been done to improve preparatory research, Professor
Schlesinger would be more pleased by methods adopted for revision
of the UCC. Much greater publicity is given to preliminary studies
and successive drafts of revised texts than was done when the UCC
was initially drafted. Committee meetings are publicized and open.
Drafting committees are much more conscious that certain interest
groups may not be represented in the committees' deliberations.
Efforts have been made, for example, to ensure consumer representa-
tion. Professor Schlesinger might question whether too many
members of study committees continue on the drafting committees,
but the very fact there are separate committees goes a long way
toward satisfying his objections.
When setting out his objections, Professor Schlesinger relied
almost exclusively on the methods adopted for the drafting of the
German Civil Code. If one focuses not on the drafting of an original
code but on revising that code, there may be useful lessons to be
learned from more recent methods adopted by civilians to revise an
existing code. The French, in particular, have struggled with this issue
since World War II. Writing in 1955, Professor Schlesinger notes the
initial work of committees charged with revising the French civil and
commercial codes. What happened to the work of these committees
and to subsequent projects might provide more pertinent suggestions
on appropriate methodology.4
D. Does the European Experience Provide Examples of the
Disadvantages of Codification?
Professor Schlesinger suggests two examples of the disadvantages
of codification: Codes may become obsolete and codification may
encourage parochialism. In response to the danger of obsolescence,
40. See, e.g., Oppetit, supra note 25; Franqois Terre & Anne Outin-Adam, Codifier est
un art difficile (d propos d'un. . . "code de commerce"), 1994 D.S. CHRON. 99 (Fr.) (stating
that in order to prevent codes from constant recodification and decodification, codes must
be developed with objectivity and broadly applied, but must remain limited to contempo-
rary standards of practical workability).
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he recommends that the UCC sponsors consider how to institutional-
ize "constant recodification"-a recommendation, it is said, that
subsequently led to the creation of the PEB for the UCC.4' His
warning against parochialism has not had a similar impact.
Professor Schlesinger chooses the failure of civil law jurisdictions
to provide for recodification as one of two warning examples of what
the sponsors of the UCC should avoid.42 The danger can be met
only by "constant recodification"-an expression, he notes, credited
to Edward Livingston. 4 This recodification requires permanent
machinery
(a) constantly to be on the alert for court decisions and
business practices which may make it appear desirable to
revise certain Code provisions, or to add new articles or
sections to the Code; (b) to study the problems so uncov-
ered; (c) to prepare the necessary revisions; and (d) to
secure the uniform adoption of such revisions.'
He states that a staff of specialists and a liaison with legislators are
indispensable, and he speculates that an interstate compact may be
necessary."
The PEB has taken on most of the tasks of Professor
Schlesinger's permanent machinery. It has done so with innovative
techniques he does not suggest. It has intervened as amicus curiae in
important appellate cases and, more recently, it has issued PEB
Commentary on the UCC46 to analyze difficult questions of interpre-
tation. The PEB does not have, however, the "indispensable"
permanent staff of specialists and it leaves the liaison with state
legislators to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL). As for interstate compacts, the UCC
sponsors have not resorted to compacts to establish the PEB or to
maintain uniformity when adopting revised texts.
It might be timely to reconsider Professor Schlesinger's proposed
permanent staff. A permanent staff of specialists may be desirable,
if not indispensable. Such a staff could provide the background
41. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (3d
ed. 1988).
42. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 57.
43. Id. at 35 & n.61.
44. Id. at 35.
45. Id.
46. See U.C.C. app. V (1990).
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studies necessary for drafting committees. At the very least staff
studies would provide a consistent approach. A staff might also
enrich the process by systematic studies of business practice and by
comparative studies. Not surprisingly, spelling out the advantages of
a permanent staff suggests the example of the New York Law
Revision Commission for which Professor Schlesinger worked.47 The
once-proud Commission, however, is a shadow of its former self and
similar commissions, in California and Louisiana have also fallen on
hard times. These commissions, in any event, have always been
exceptional. Despite occasional calls for a "Ministry of Justice"
model of lawmaking,4 the United States has always preferred
lawmaking on the cheap. Certainly the UCC sponsors have tradition-
ally relied, in effect, on volunteer labor. Whether or not the work of
these volunteers is suspect,49 one can anticipate some resistance to
professionalizing the work of the PEB. Cost, of course, is a factor
and it may be that when these costs are weighed against the bene-
fits-many of which are intangible-of a permanent staff that the
proposal should be rejected. All that is suggested here is that the
issue be considered. When doing so, of course, it might be useful to
take a look at foreign law-making models, especially at the recent
experience with law reform commissions in the major common law
countries such as England."
The value of reexamining the use of interstate compacts is more
speculative. At the time Professor Schlesinger wrote, Professor Paul
Freund reported to the New York Commission on the possible uses
of compacts in relation to the UCC.5' The UCC sponsors took no
action and there has been virtually no reference to the device in
subsequent debates about revision and uniformity. It may, however,
be worth looking once again at interstate compacts. Approval of
more and more revised code articles may lead to a quiltwork of
47. For a review of the work of the New York Commission at the height of its
influence, see John W. MacDonald, Legal Research Translated into Legislative Action-The
New York Law Revision Commission 1934-1963,48 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1963).
48. See Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113,114-15 (1921).
49. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 604 (1995).
50. For recent assessments, see Stephen Cretney, The Politics of Law Reform-A View
from the Inside, 48 MOD. L. REV. 493,507-08 (1985); P. M. North, Law Reform: Processes
and Problems, 101 LAW Q. REv. 338,338-46 (1985); Anthony Ogus, Economics and Law
Reform: Thirty Years of Law Commission Endeavour, 111 LAW Q. REV. 407,407 (1995).
Experience in Australia and Canada should not be ignored.
51. See 3 NYLRC, supra note 3, at 2177.
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adoptions that will lead to such great nonuniformity that novel
techniques may be necessary. New legislative techniques may also be
necessary to integrate the growing number of international commer-
cial law texts into a federal system in which private law has tradition-
ally been the province of the states. Use of interstate compacts in this
context was proposed as long ago as 1921 when Dean John Henry
Wigmore made the proposal in a detailed report to the NCCUSL.52
It may not be, in other words, merely an academic exercise to reread
the Freund and Wigmore reports or to examine how states have used
interstate compacts since 1960.
As for Professor Schlesinger's warning that codification may
encourage parochialism, there is little doubt that much of the energy
of U.S. commercial law scholars has been directed at the UCC and
they have shown little interest in foreign commercial law. The
reasons for this parochialism, however, are complex and multiple.
Moreover, scholars and graduate law students from other parts of the
world have not been as parochial. Many of them have attended
graduate school in the United States or have been visiting professors
in U.S. law schools. For those who have not been to the United
States, the UCC provides easier access to U.S. commercial law. These
scholars and students come from all parts of a world in which English
has become the lingua franca. In this respect Professor Schlesinger's
emphasis on the danger of isolation within the English-speaking world
because "[t]he common legal heritage of the English-speaking world
is one of the constructive forces in the world today"53 comes from a
different generation.
E. Do Civilians Offer Any Guidance on How to Deal with
Standard Form Contracts?
Faced with an economy characterized by mass production, mass
distribution, and mass credit, U.S. legislation and court decisions
"traditionally deal in a casuistic manner with specific types of clauses,
and do not treat the problem as a general one which permeates the
52. NCCUSL, Report of the Committee on Inter-State Compacts 297, in HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE (1921); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann,
Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules
on Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 339 (1954) (discussing Wigmore's proposal).
53. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 26.
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whole law of contracts." 4 The civilians have faced the same issue
and resolved it with a variety of devices: "general clauses," stringent
form requirements, prohibition of specific terms, statutory standard
terms, and regulation of trade associations and their standard
forms." Various articles of the UCC address the need for standard-
ized business deals-Professor Schlesinger cites Articles 4, 8, and
9-but the UCC refrains from laying down general rules for standard
contract terms. 6 Professor Schlesinger does not conclude that
"sweeping general rules applicable to all standardized contracts are
necessarily superior to the casuistic approach [of U.S. law], 57 but he
does urge serious study of the advantages and disadvantages of the
various approaches.58 He also recommends that the UCC drafters
should consider whether Article 1 should provide some guidance,
either by setting out general rules on standard contract terms or by
cross-referencing specific rules in the various articles 9 Clear and
conscious resolution of these issues is necessary, he implies, if the
UCC is to live up to its sponsors' billing as an adjustment of U.S.
commercial law to "the facts of 20th century business life."'6
Notwithstanding Professor Schlesinger's recommendation, the
UCC sponsors did not carry out a study of the various approaches to
standard form contracts. Karl Llewellyn, who had recognized the
problem much earlier 6' and who in 1941 had drafted a section to
deal expressly with form sales contracts,' did not have an opportuni-
54. Id. at 32.
55. IM.
56. Id. at 31-32. In the original report Professor Schlesinger states that "[i]t is not
clear whether a coherent policy underlies the various provisions." 1 NYLRC, supra note
3, at 101. He omits this sentence without explanation in his 1959 law review article.
Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 32.
57. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 32.
58. Id. at 32-33.
59. Id. at 33.
60. Id. at 31.
61. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 362-
71 (1960); Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 701-03 (1939).
62. The section was promptly withdrawn because the section's essential objectives are
believed to be solid and to call for attention. They are:
(a) to further the use, in construction of particular contracts, of written
agreed rules of trade practice; and
(b) to distinguish, in transactions concluded on printed forms prepared by
one party, between the terms really dickered and bargained about, and the
unread block of print.
But the machinery for administration thus far developed is inadequate, and
is too unreckonable to be in keeping with the lines of the Draft.
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ty to deal with the issue at greater length before his death in 1962.
Individual scholars such as Professors David Slawson,' Todd
Rakoff, and Eric Holmes' have studied standard contracts, but
as yet there is no scholarly consensus on the appropriate legal
response. Nor have judges done better. The Restatement of
Contracts includes a single, tentative provision on standardized
contracts.6 Section 2-207 of the UCC addresses the "battle of
forms" but few commentaries on this notorious section recognize that
it only deals with a particular instance of the use of standardized
forms. The approach of U.S. law remains casuistic and unsystematic.
There is nothing to suggest that business use of standard form
contracts will decrease in the twenty-first century. Indeed, new issues
will emerge with the growth of electronic commerce. How will
standard terms be translated to a world where parties conclude
contracts by the exchange of electronic messages? It is therefore
heartening to note that the drafting committee revising Article 2
proposes to introduce a section on "assent to standard form re-
cords."'67 Comments to this section state that it is inspired in part by
the Principles of International Commercial Contracts prepared by
UNIDROIT." This UNIDROIT text, in turn, can be traced to
civilian concepts and special laws.69
Whether or not this proposal for Article 2 is ultimately accepted,
it is at best only a partial response to Professor Schlesinger's call for
a more systematic study of the alternatives. Professor Schlesinger
1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 332 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984). These
two lines of policy were approved as desirable but "conditioned on adequate [implementa-
tion] machinery being discovered." Id at 331. This recommendation ultimately led to the
"unconscionability" provision of the final text. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
63. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21 (1985); W. David Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV.
529 (1971).
64. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REv. 1174 (1983).
65. Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thurmann, A New and Old Theory for Adjudicating
Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323 (1987).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
67. U.C.C. § 2-206 (discussion draft Oct. 1, 1995).
68. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS arts.
2.19-.22 (1994).
69. MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT
LAW 91-95 (1995) (citing the German Law on Standard Contracts [Gesetz zur Regelung
des Rechts derAllgemeinen Geschdftsbedingungen-AGBG]; the Italian, Dutch, Quebec, and
Louisiana civil codes; and EEC Directive 93/13).
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notes some of the civilian responses to the phenomenon of standard
contracts. A systematic study today should take into account civilian
developments since 1955, with special attention to the German Law
on Standard Contracts." The study would also ask whether Article
1 should provide some guidance. Professor Schlesinger's call for such
a study should, in other words, be renewed today.
F Are the "Commercial Law" Concerns of Contemporary
Civilians of Any Relevance to the Drafters of the UCC?
At the time Professor Schlesinger wrote his report, civilians were
engaged in debate about the unity of private law versus the autonomy
of commercial law-an issue the common law resolved several
centuries ago when it absorbed the law merchant.7 This civilian
debate is therefore, he concludes, of little interest to U.S. lawyers
wrestling with the question of whether to codify commercial law.
In 1955 the trend was clearly in favor of those who argued for the
unity of private law. This trend has continued during the forty
intervening years so that today we could report, as Professor Boris
Kozolchyk has, on the The Commercialization of Civil Law and the
Civilization of Commercial Law. - There are traces of the debate in
the legal literature but the heat has dissipated.
Ironically, during this same period the consumer movement has
appeared to challenge the unity of private law. Civilians have not
drafted "consumer codes" on the model of the older commercial
codes but legislation provides special protection for consumer
transactions otherwise subject to the civil code. In recent years
supranational directives issued by the European Community have
further complicated the picture. For civilians today the challenge is
to explain how these regulatory rules fit into the world of civil codes.
The consumer movement has, of course, also had an impact on
U.S. law. Much of this impact has come through federal and state
legislation enacted during the late 1960s and 1970s. Except for
environmental legislation, there have been few consumer initiatives
since 1980 and the present political climate does not bode well for
further federal legislation. In these developments the uniform law
70. For a summary of the 1976 German law, see Otto Sandrock, The Standard Terms
Act 1976 of West Germany, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 551 (1978).
71. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 49-50.
72. Boris Kozolchyk, The Commercialization of Civil Law and the Civilization of
Commercial Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 3 (1979).
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commissioners have had relatively little influence. The original UCC
had few provisions specifically addressing consumer transactions.
Even after a 1974 revision of the 1968 Uniform Consumer Credit
Code,73 few states have enacted this uniform consumer legislation.
Revision of Articles 2 and 9 of the UCC gives the uniform law
commissioners another opportunity to examine how consumer
protections might be incorporated into the UCC. The drafting
committees for both projects have established consumer task forces.
Financial support for consumer representatives on these task forces
has been solicited through the efforts of Professor Amy Boss and Ed
Smith, former and present chairs of the UCC Committee of the ABA.
Business Law Section. Is it too much to hope that these task forces
might look to recent civilian experience? Writing before the
consumer movement picked up pace, Professor Schlesinger has little
to say in his 1955 report about protection for consumers in civil law
jurisdictions. But surely he would be among the first to urge such a
study today.74
G. Does the Civilian Experience Offer Any Guidance on How to
Promote Uniformity?
Comparing the situation in the United States with that of
Germany after the enactment of the 1861 Commercial Code and
before the enactment of the Civil Code at the end of the century,75
Professor Schlesinger notes the absence in the United States of a
73. UNIF. CONSUMER CRED. CODE (1974).
74. There is some hope that such a study will be carried out at least unofficially. In
a recent e-mail message to me, Professor Kathleen Patchel wrote:
[Professor Amy Boss] and I are going to write an article discussing the current
debate over whether to draft separate consumer codes or continue U.C.C.
coverage of consumer transactions and I thought it would be useful to contrast
the inclusion of consumer transactions in the U.C.C. with the civil law tradition
Electronic message from Kathleen Patchel to Peter Winship (Oct. 24, 1995) (on file with
author).
75. Before enactment of the German Civil Code, the uniform rules of the commercial
code in Germany had to be integrated with the nonuniform general law of the local states
making up what became the German empire. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 24. The
Supreme Commercial Court in Leipzig not only interpreted the German Commercial Code
but also, by deciding pendent issues of local law, determined conflicts between the code
and local substantive or procedural law. Id at 51-54. When he writes of maintaining
uniformity, therefore, Professor Schlesinger is concerned not only with interpretation of
the UCC text but also with the possibility that general state law might be read to limit the
UCC provisions.
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single court of last resort to hear commercial disputes.7 6 The UCC
drafters must therefore use other techniques to maintain uniformity.
Professor Schlesinger proposes several techniques-limit coverage of
the UCC to areas with well-established rules, look to legal scholar-
ship, and institutionalize "constant recodification"--without suggesting
that these techniques are borrowed from the civilian experience.7
This experience does, however, suggest some benefits from creating
and maintaining uniformity. Following enactment of a uniform code,
both academics and local practitioners will be interested in a common
"national" commercial law and this "will help to narrow the gap
between practical law and academic law-to the benefit of both." 8
Similarly, a uniform code will allow foreign academics and practition-
ers easier access to U.S. commercial law and may facilitate future
international efforts to harmonize commercial law around the
world.79
In 1995 the likelihood that the UCC will be enacted as federal
law is as remote as it was in 1955. Issues of Code interpretation
therefore come before the United States Supreme Court only
incidentally. Nonuniformity is not, however, a major threat today.
Techniques proposed by Professor Schlesinger have played an
important role. The willingness of the PEB to revise the UCC
periodically has been particularly important, but published textbooks
and commentaries have also discouraged nonuniform interpretations.
There have been other influences not mentioned by Professor
Schlesinger but with analogs abroad: legal education using national
casebooks to train students who increasingly search for jobs outside
the locale of their law schools, and easier access to non-local court
decisions through specialized reporting services or through electronic
databases.
As for the gap between practitioners and academics, Professor
Schlesinger's prediction that both groups would benefit from a
uniform national text has been borne out. Commercial law professors
are among the least likely academics to be the object of criticism by
those who fear that law schools are drifting away from the real
problems facing practicing lawyers. Many of these professors
76. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 51-53.
77. Id. at 54.
78. Id- at 55.
79. Id.
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participate actively in the work of the UCC's sponsors, as well as in
the commercial law sections of the ABA. and local bar associations.
More intriguing is Professor Schlesinger's suggestion that national
adoption of the UCC may facilitate international harmonization of
commercial law. To the extent commercial law rules are /us
dispositivum, private rule-making bodies, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce, cannot provide the rules. Harmonization
therefore depends upon cooperation between nations. Adoption of
the UCC as a uniform national law is a preparatory step toward "the
ultimate goal of international harmonization of conflicting laws."80
This analysis suggests three queries. Is uniform adoption of the UCC
truly a "preparatory step" for international harmonization? What
institutional arrangement will be necessary to take additional steps?
Is international harmonization of conflicting laws the ultimate goal for
the UCC sponsors?
National unification of U.S. commercial law by uniform adoption
of the UCC may actually inhibit international harmonization.
Attempts earlier this century to draft uniform negotiable instruments
legislation provides a cautionary example. Diplomatic conferences
adopted uniform texts in the Geneva conventions of 1930 and 1931,
but only civil-law countries became parties to the conventions. A
common explanation is that common-law countries had effectively
unified their legislation earlier in the century by enacting legislation
based on the U.K. Bills of Exchange Act,81 and these countries were
unwilling to give up this earlier partial uniformity in favor of a strange
and untried "uniform" text.' Similarly, U.S. states that have
enacted the UCC may be reluctant to modify the UCC to harmonize
it With "foreign" concepts and rules. It is not self-evident, in other
words, that adoption of the UCC is necessarily a "preparatory step"
for international: harmonization.
Even if adoption of the UCC is a preparatory step, further
progress towards international harmonization requires intervention of
the federal government. At the time Professor Schlesinger wrote, it
was generally assumed that approaches to foreign governments and
80. Id.
81. BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACr OF 1882, c. 61 (U.K.), reprinted in A. G. GUEST,
CHALMERS AND GUEST ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CHEQUES AND PROMISSORY NOTES 1
(14th ed. 1991).
82. See Hessel E. Yntema, Unification of the Laws Respecting Negotiable Instruments,
4 INT'L L.Q. 178, 187 (1951).
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representation at international diplomatic conferences must be made
through the federal government.s3 Yet, as noted earlier, he criticizes
the UCC sponsors for ignoring international harmonization or
attempting to cooperate with other countries. He does not indicate,
however, what steps the UCC sponsors should take "to inspire
cooperation and parallel efforts in any other country."'  Subsequent
history suggests that there can be coordination between the sponsors
and the U.S. Department of State but that it takes effort. 5 Whether
this effort has been effective deserves a study in itself. One can only
regret that Professor Schlesinger did not focus on the problem.
That he did not focus on it is all the more regretable given his
surprising reference to "the ultimate goal of international harmoniza-
tion of conflicting laws" 6 -a goal which he earlier recognizes "may
be a Utopian goal at this time."'  This is surprising because it is
highly unlikely that the UCC sponsors would have supported-or
would support-a goal that smacks of "internationalism" and "World
Government." It is additionally surprising because this normative
theme has died out among younger comparativists raised on relativism
and "objective" social science. Professor Schlesinger does not
elaborate or defend the goal, but his reference to the goal is just as
relevant today as it was in 1955.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Professor Schlesinger's 1955 report to the New York Law
Revision Commission is just as relevant and stimulating today as it
was when written. The questions he asks are timeless and, for the
most part, his answers are still persuasive. As an example of how
comparative research may offer useful insights for U.S. scholars and
practitioners, the report remains a model. Read-or reread-it.
83. See Nadelmann, supra note 52, at 362.
84. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 26.
85. For a general review of the U.S. practice, see Peter H. Pfund, Overview of the
Codification Process, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1989).
86. Schlesinger, supra note 1, at 55.
87. Id. at 26 n.35.
